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In this paper, using microdata in Japan, we investigate whether credit contagion decreases 
trade credit supply for small businesses. In 1997-98 the Japanese economy experienced a 
large recession, and the number of dishonored bills and the number of bankruptcy filings 
caused by the domino effect increased. During a period of credit contagion, if firms possess 
higher financial claims than other firms, the possibility of default becomes higher. 
Therefore, if the problem of credit contagion is serious during such a period, suppliers 
withdraw trade credit from customers with higher trade receivables. They might also 
withdraw more trade credit from customers even though the credit risk of the customers is 
low. We find that during a recession, suppliers reduce trade credit more for small 
businesses with higher trade receivables. Additionally, in the manufacturing trade, credit is 
reduced for both risky and non-risky small firms. This effect in other industries, however, is 
weak.
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Using microdata, we investigate whether credit contagion decreases trade credit supply 
for small businesses. Many papers focus on the effects of financial contagion on 
economic activity. According to Kaufman (1994), contagion is “the spillover of effects 
of shocks from one or more firms to others” (p. 123) and the problem of contagion is 
likely to occur in banking industries. For example, Calomiris and Mason (1997) analyze 
whether solvent banks failed during the Chicago bank panic in 1932 as the result of 
confusion about a bank’s credit risk by depositors. Allen and Gale (2000) theoretically 
analyze liquidity shocks and financial contagion to banks. However, both banks and 
non-financial firms act as intermediaries in the provision of credit. As Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997a) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2002) argue, non-financial firms form links by 
giving trade credit to one another. Non-financial firms are also “financial institutions” 
because they take credit from suppliers and offer credit to their customers. If a firm 
suffers from an unanticipated liquidity shock and defaults, the effect of the shock 
spreads to the firms that have financial claims on the defaulting firm. Additionally, the 
effects of the unanticipated liquidity shock spread to many other firms by a similar 
process.  
 
Despite many papers examining the effects of bank runs, there are few papers that focus 
on the relationship between financial contagion and trade credit linkages.
1 Empirical 
studies about trade credit contagion do not focus adequately on this relationship. As 
stated by Chen (2004) and Miwa and Ramseyer (2005), trade creditors are unsecured 
creditors, which are different from secured bank lenders. Therefore, if the unanticipated 
liquidity shock spreads to many firms and they default because of financial contagion, 
trade creditors suffer large losses. According to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a), the 
possibility of default is higher during a period of credit contagion if firms possess 
higher financial claims against other firms. Suppliers can observe which customers 
possess higher trade receivables, so suppliers withdraw trade credit from these 
                                                 
1  See Petersen and Rajan (1997), Fisman and Love (2003), and Burkart et al. (2005) for detailed discussions about 
trade credit. See also Ono (2001), Uesugi and Yamashiro (2006), and Tsuruta (2006) for detailed discussion about 
trade credit in Japan.   2
customers if the problem of credit contagion becomes serious. In addition, if trade 
creditors have difficulty anticipating which firms will default because of contagion, they 
withdraw credit from their customers even though firm-specific risk is low.   
 
In this paper, using microdata during the Japanese recession of 1997–98, we investigate 
whether credit contagion decreases trade credit supply for small businesses. In this 
period, the growth rate of the GDP in Japan dropped to around -1.8% (in 1998) and the 
Japanese economy experienced a large recession. Moreover, the number of bills not 
honored and bankruptcy filings caused by the domino effect rose during the recession. 
Therefore, the problem of credit contagion was considered to be serious during this 
period. If many firms are worried about trade credit linkages among firms and the 
default of customers because of credit contagion, suppliers will withdraw trade credit 
from customers with higher trade receivables in order to avoid large losses. In addition, 
suppliers refuse to offer trade credit to customers even though the credit risk of the 
customers is low.   
 
We use the Credit Risk Database (CRD), which is a large panel database of small 
businesses in Japan. The dataset contains the balance sheet data and profit and loss data 
of 100,691 small businesses during the 1997–98 recession, so this database is suitable 
for our analysis. Using the CRD, our analysis shows the following results. First, trade 
payables decreased during the recession of 1997–98, especially for manufacturers and 
wholesalers. Second, the decline in trade payables was higher if trade debtors had many 
financial claims from their customers during the recession. This result strongly supports 
the possibility that credit contagion reduces trade credit supply. Third, trade credit 
supply was reduced for both risky and non-risky small manufacturing firms whereas 
these effects were weak for other industries.   
 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the theoretical and empirical 
literature on credit contagion. In Section 3, we show what happened during 1997–98 
using macrodata and small business data. We describe our dataset and discuss the 
empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
   3
 
2 Previous Papers 
2.1 Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Credit Runs   
There are many theoretical and empirical studies about bank runs. Diamond and Dybig 
(1983) and Chen (1999) develop theoretical models of depositors and examine how the 
problem of bank runs occurs. Many empirical papers, for example, Calomiris and 
Mason (1997), Schumacher (2000), Peria et al. (2001), and Calomiris and Mason (2003), 
test the theory of bank runs. Calomiris and Mason (1997) use data from the Chicago 
bank panic of June 1932. They compare the ex ante characteristics of panic failures and 
panic survivors and show that the panic did not produce significant social costs in terms 
of failures among solvent banks. Schumacher (2000) examines the case of Argentina 
during the 1994–95 “Tequila Crisis.” He shows that the weak banks were most likely to 
lose deposits and fail during the crisis, despite Argentina having no deposit insurance 
system. Using a unique dataset from India, Iyer and Peydro-Alcalde (2006) investigate 
whether a bank’s position in the interbank market affects its level of depositor runs. 
They show that the level of exposure to the failed bank is an important determinant of 
depositor runs. On the other hand, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997a) and Kiyotaki and Moore 
(2002) focus on trade credit. Their models show that in the case of liquidity shocks, 
trade credit relationships between firms may promote credit contagion and many firms 
fail to default because of the spread of the contagion. Also, Franks and Sussman (2005) 
and Tsuruta and Xu (2007) investigate credit runs using a sample of bankrupt firms. 
 
2.2 Financial Shocks and Trade Credit 
Although many previous studies investigate the effects of macrofinancial shocks, they 
focus on the relationship between financial shocks and the supply of bank credit.
2 For 
example, Hahm and Mishkin (2000) research the Korean case. They find that during 
financial crises, banks reduce their loans not only for risky firms, but also for safe firms. 
According to Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999), a credit crunch occurred in the 
Japanese economy after 1997 and Japanese banks reduced the credit supply to small 
businesses. However, as Welch (1997) shows, banks in general are secured lenders, so 
                                                 
2  See Mishkin (1997) for more detailed discussion.   4
they have less incentive to monitor the credit risk of their borrowers. Secured creditors 
make fewer losses if the borrowers default, so banks do not recall a large number of 
loans if an unanticipated macrofinancial shock affects their borrowers.
3 
 
Some studies investigate the relationship between bank credit and the behavior of trade 
creditors during financial shocks. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) insist that trends in trade 
credit are countercyclical and that suppliers offer more trade credit during recessions. 
Nilsen (2002) finds that small firms increase their reliance on trade credit during 
monetary contractions. On the other hand, Marotta (1997) finds, using Italian data, that 
there is no evidence that suppliers offer credit for small firms to mitigate a monetary 
squeeze. Love et al. (2007) investigate the effect of financial crises on trade credit in 
emerging economies. They find that bank credit is redistributed from financially 
stronger firms to weaker firms by using trade credit. Fukuda et al. (2006) focus on the 
role of trade credit in Japan during banking crises, and the substitution hypothesis 
between bank credit and trade credit is not supported in this period.   
 
Some papers investigate intra- or interindustrial contagion using event study methods. 
For example, Lang and Stulz (1992) investigate the effects of bankruptcy 
announcements on the equity value of the bankrupt firm’s competitors. Similarly, 
Brewer III and Jackson III (2002) study the negative effects on the stock returns of life 
insurance companies of interindustrial contagion caused by financial distress 
announcements by commercial banks. However, they do not focus on the relationships 
between trade credit chains and contagion. 
 
3 Economic Shock during 1997–98   
3.1 The Increase in Dishonored Bills and The Decline of Trade Payables   
During 1997–98 in Japan, GDP growth became negative and the Japanese economy 
experienced a large and serious recession. Yamaichi Shouken, which was one of the 
large securities trading firms in Japan, and the Hokkaido-Takushoku bank, which was 
one of Japan’s largest banks, went bankrupt. Also, many non-financial firms struggled 
                                                 
3  If the value of collateral assets deteriorates, banks reduce their credit supply to small businesses. See Kiyotaki and   5
with the economic downturn and the number of firms that declared bankruptcy 
increased. In this period, the main cause of bankruptcy changed. According to Figure 1, 
the numbers of “Side Effect of Bankruptcy of Another Company” and “Diffculty 
Recovering Accounts Receivable, Cumulative Loss” both increased, despite the fact 
that the number of “Slumping Sales” decreased. This implies that the default of firms 
might have induced many suppliers to fall into default. The number of dishonored bills 
also increased. Table 1 shows the growth rate of dishonored bills. According to this 
figure, the sum of dishonored bills increased by 27% and the number of dishonored bills 
increased by 28% for two years from 1996.   
 
The amount of trade payables decreased during the recession. The data in Panel A of 
Table 2 shows the trend of trade payables from 1996 to 2000 using the CRD. According 
to this table, the average growth rate in trade payables was -0.59% in 1996, but fell to 
-6.91% in 1997 and -10.01% in 1998. The magnitude of the decline of trade payables in 
1997 and 1998 shown in this table was likely to have had large impacts on small 
businesses. We also use a second method of calculating the trade payables growth rate 
because firms that do not use trade credit are excluded if we use the trade payables 
growth rate defined in Panel A. In Panel B of Table 2, the trade payables growth rate is 
defined as (a firm’s trade payables in t+1 minus trade payables in t)/total assets in t. 
Even if we change the definition of the growth rate, the average growth rate of trade 
payables was also negative during 1997 and 1998. 
 
These impacts differ because of firm size and industry. Table 2 also shows the average 
and median trade payables growth rate for larger, medium, and smaller firms. In Panel 
A, the impact on small firms is larger. However, if we change the definition of the 
growth rate, the decline of trade payables is higher for large firms. In Table 3, we 
present the average trade payables growth rate for firms in each industry group. This 
table shows that in 1997 and 1998 the decline of trade payables for manufacturing firms 
and wholesalers was higher than for other firms.   
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3.2 Hypothesis   
In this paper, we test whether credit contagion during the recession in Japan decreased 
trade credit supply. In general, suppliers offer trade credit for customers, and these 
customers offer trade credit for their customers. Firms construct a huge financial 
network by offering and taking trade credit. Therefore, if some firms are adversely 
affected by liquidity shocks and unable to repay their trade debt, the suppliers that offer 
trade credit for default firms also might be unable to repay their trade debt. According 
to Kaufman (1994), contagion is the spillover of the effects of shocks from one or more 
firms to other firms. If credit contagion is serious, the firms with higher trade 
receivables are likely to default because of credit contagion. Therefore, suppliers reduce 
trade credit more for customers with higher trade receivables when credit contagion is 
serious. 
 
As we described, trade creditors are unsecured lenders, so they suffer large losses when 
customers do not repay trade credit. Accordingly, they have an incentive to monitor the 
credit risk of their customers and to cut back on their credit supply to risky firms. 
During the recession, the performance of many customers deteriorated sharply, and 
therefore, suppliers might have reduced the credit supply to many distressed firms. For 
this reason, the decline of trade payables might not be caused by credit contagion, but 
rather by suppliers reducing their credit to risky firms. On the other hand, if the effects 
of credit contagion are serious, the possibility of default for both high-risk and low-risk 
groups of small firms becomes higher because of credit contagion, and suppliers might 
reduce trade credit for all firms. That is, if credit contagion decreases trade credit supply, 
suppliers reduce trade credit for all firms even though the idiosyncratic risk of 
customers is low. If credit contagion is not an issue for suppliers, they reduce trade 
credit for only risky firms, which is usual practice. 
 
4 Econometric Analysis   
4.1 Data   
The CRD is one of the larger databases concerning small businesses in Japan. This 
database was established by a number of financial institutions and credit guarantee   7
corporations under the guidance of the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency in Japan.
4 
The CRD targets firms defined as Small and Medium Enterprises under the Small and 
Medium Enterprise Basic Law in Japan.
5 The dataset in this study includes only 
corporations that existed for more than two consecutive years in the CRD. We omitted 
financial and small farm businesses and the data collected from credit guarantee 
corporations. Also, we limited firms in the sample to those that settle in January, 
February, or March. As a result, the number of firms in this study is 100,691. The CRD 
includes 91 variables from the firm’s balance sheets and profit and loss statements. It 
also contains the year of establishment, industry classification, and the geographic 
location of each firm.   
 
4.2 Estimation   
We estimate the following equation using the CRD data.   
Trade Payables Growth 2 1 α α + = ijt Trade Receivables 3 α + ijt Credit Risk ijt  
∑ +
T
4 α Year Dummy ijt ijt t X ∈ + + 5 α  (1) 
 
X = (Firm scale, Sales growth, ROA, Collateral assets, Interest rate, Cash holding, 
Regional dummies, Industrial dummies)   
 
T=1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 
 
 
Xijt is a matrix of control variables and ijt is the error term of firm i at prefecture j in year 
t. The firms that possess more trade receivables of other firms might have many 
non-performing credits. In addition, trade debtors with higher trade receivables are more 
                                                 
4  See http://www.crd.ne.jp/ (in Japanese) for more information about the CRD. 
5  According to White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises in Japan, “Under the Small and Medium Enterprise 
Basic Law, the term ‘small and medium enterprises’ (SMEs) generally refers to enterprises with capital stock under 
300 million yen and/or 300 or less regular employees, and sole proprietorships with 300 or less employees. However, 
SMEs in the wholesaling industry are defined as enterprises with capital stock under 100 million yen and/or 100 or 
fewer employees, SMEs in the retailing industry are defined as enterprises with capital stock under 50 million yen 
and/or a workforce of 50 or less, while SMEs in the service industry are defined as enterprises with capital stock 
under 50 million yen and/or a workforce of 100 or less. Small enterprises are defined as enterprises with 20 or fewer 
employees. In the commercial and service industries, however, they are defined as enterprises with five employees or 
less.”   8
likely to suffer from credit contagion. The credit risk of those firms is higher during the 
recession period of 1997–98. Therefore, the suppliers reduce trade credit more for 
customers with higher trade receivables. We expect that the negative effects of Trade 
Receivablesijt on trade payables growth are larger during economic shock periods. The 
prediction is that α2
shockperiods < 0 and α2 
shock periods < α2 
non-shock  periods if the problem of credit 
contagion reduces the supply of trade credit for firms with higher trade receivables. We 
check this hypothesis by including the products of trade receivables and the year 
dummies for 1997 and 1998 in Equation (1). 
 
The unanticipated macro-shock during 1997–98 might induce trade credit runs and 
decrease the supply of trade credit, even if the default risk of trade debtors is low. In 
non-economic shock periods, suppliers withdraw their trade credit from only risky firms. 
Thus, we predict that the coefficient of Credit Riskijt is negative. On the other hand, 
suppliers might withdraw their trade credit from all firms when the problem of credit 
contagion is serious. If the suppliers withdraw their trade credit from all small firms, the 
impacts of Credit Riskijt are small during the economic shock periods of 1997 and 1998 
and the effects of Year Dummy1997 and Year Dummy1998 are likely to be negative. Thus, 
we predict that α3
shockperiods  >   α 3
non-shockperiods, and α4
1997 <  0, and α4
1998 < 0 if the 
problem of credit contagion reduces the supply of trade credit for non-risky firms. We 
check this hypothesis by including the products of credit risk and the year dummies for 
1997 and 1998 in Equation (1). 
 
We also specify several control variables: firm scale, sales growth, ROA, collateral 
assets, interest rates, cash–short-term loan ratio, industry dummies, and regional 
dummies. Generally, the larger firms use more trade credit, so firms that are growing 
more quickly increase their trade payables. Firms that make more profit use less trade 
credit because they have more internal cash, so we predict that ROA has a negative 
effect for trade payables growth. As Tsuruta (2006) argues, suppliers have an advantage 
in salvaging value from existing assets. Thus, firms that possess fewer collateral assets 
use more trade credit because they cannot borrow enough from banks. Also, we predict 
that firms with a higher interest rate use more trade credit. Firms with lower   9
cash–short-term loan ratio cannot repay debts if they have large losses. Therefore, 
suppliers do not offer trade credit to such firms and the coefficients of the 
cash–short-term loan ratio are likely to be negative. 
 
We do not have all the information that affects the determinants of trade payables 
growth. For example, we do not have data about the length of the relationships between 
suppliers and customers. Previous studies, such as Uchida et al. (2006), claim that the 
length of relationships affects the supply of trade credit, so the problem of unobserved 
effects may be serious. Because we employ panel data, we can estimate using the fixed 
effects model to eliminate time-invariant unobserved effects. However, the F test for 
individual effects is not statistically significant. Hence, we estimate Equation (1) using 
OLS. The definition of each variable is shown in the Appendix. 
 
4.3 Results   
4.3.1 The effects of trade receivables and credit risk   
We show summary statistics in Table 4 and the estimation results in Tables 5-19. Table 
5 is the model without the product variables. According to this table, the coefficient of 
credit risk is negative and statistically significant (Column (1)). This result is not 
changed if we use capital deficiency2, leverage, and total loans–sales ratio as proxies of 
credit risk (Columns (2)–(4)). These results suggest that suppliers lower trade credit for 
risky firms. The effects of the trade receivables turnaround period, which is a proxy for 
the amount of financial claims from customers, are negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level. This result implies that suppliers reduce their trade credit for customers 
with higher trade receivables. The effects of the year dummies also suggest that the 
economic shock decreases trade payables. As stated in the previous section, the large 
recession became serious in 1997–98. The coefficients of the year dummies for 1997 
and 1998 are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
The effects of the other control variables are consistent with what we predicted in the 
previous subsection except for interest rates. Sales growth and the cash–short-term loan 
ratio have positive effects, and ROA and the tangible asset ratio have negative effects 
on the amount of trade payables. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%  10
and 5% level. 
 
4.3.2 The effects of trade receivables during the economic shock   
In Table 6, we show the results of the products of trade receivables and the year 
dummies for 1997 and 1998. We use two proxies for trade receivables: turnaround 
period
6 and the ratio of trade receivables to assets. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, 
we estimate the OLS model. The coefficients of the proxies of trade receivables are 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level if we use the trade receivables 
turnaround period as a proxy for trade receivables (column (1)). However, the 
coefficients of trade receivables become positive if we change the proxy (column (2)). 
The effects of trade receivables for trade payables growth are ambiguous. The 
coefficients of products of trade receivables and the year dummies for 1997 and 1998 
are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result does not depend on 
the types of proxy of trade receivables, so these results are robust. While the coefficient 
of the trade receivables–assets ratio is 0.00584, the coefficient of the trade 
receivables–assets ratio * year dummy for 1997 is -0.4803 and for 1998 is -0.04367 
(column (2)). Thus, the effect of the trade receivables–assets ratio turns out to be 
negative in 1997 and 1998. From these results, we can see that suppliers reduce trade 
credit more for customers with higher trade receivables during the recession, which is 
consistent with our hypothesis. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, we do not know 
whether trade payables decreased or not because we used the trade payables growth rate 
as the dependent variable. To overcome this problem, we used the probability of an 
increase in trade payables as the independent variable. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 
are the results of the logit estimation. The results in columns (3) and (4) are similar to 
the results of the OLS estimation in columns (1) and (2), except for the coefficient of 
the trade receivable–sales ratio in column (4). The results of the logit estimation imply 
that suppliers are likely to reduce trade credit to firms with higher trade receivables, as 
was especially the case during the 1997–98 recession. 
 
 
                                                 
6  The trade receivables turnaround period is defined as Trade Receivables/Sales  11
4.3.3 The effects of credit risk during the economic shock   
To compare the effects of credit risk in shock and non-shock periods, we add the 
products of credit risk and the year dummies for 1997 and 1998. As we argued, if the 
unanticipated macro-shock decreases the supply of trade credit for risky and non-risky 
firms, the impact of credit risk is smaller in the shock periods than in the non-shock 
periods. Therefore, we predict that the year dummies for 1997 and 1998 are negative 
and the product of credit risk and the year dummies for 1997 and 1998 is positive. We 
use several proxies of a firm’s credit risk: two types of capital deficiency dummy, 
leverage, and total debts–sales ratio. The definition of each variable is shown in the 
appendix.  
 
We show the results using all samples in Table 7. The coefficients of credit risk are 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. These results imply that suppliers 
decreased trade payables more for risky firms in the non-shock periods. The coefficients 
of the year dummies for 1997 and 1998 are negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level. On the other hand, the coefficients of credit risk * year dummies for 1997 are 
positive and statistically significant at the 10% level if the proxies of credit risk are the 
two types of capital deficiency (columns (1) and (2)). Moreover, the coefficients of the 
total debts–sales ratio * year dummies for 1997 and 1998 are both positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level (column (4)). According to these results, 
suppliers significantly reduced trade credit for not only risky firms, but also non-risky 
firms in 1997 and 1998. If we use leverage for the proxy of credit risk, the coefficients 
of credit risk * year dummies for 1997 are not statistically significant (column (3)) and 
the coefficient for 1998 turns out to be negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. 
 
As we mentioned, we cannot know whether trade payables decrease or not when the 
independent variable is the trade payables growth rate. Thus, we also use the probability 
of an increase in trade payables as an independent variable. Table 8 presents the results 
of logit estimation. The coefficients of the year dummies for 1997 and 1998 are 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Additionally, the coefficients of 
credit risk * year dummy for 1997 are positive and statistically significant at the 1%  12
level. The coefficients of credit risk * year dummy for 1998 are also positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. According to the results of Table 7 and Table 8, 
suppliers might have significantly reduced trade credit for risky and non-risky firms in 
1997 and/or 1998.   
 
4.3.4 Comparison by industry sector   
The strength of trade credit linkages differs by industry. Table 9 shows the average and 
median day payables outstanding (DPO)
7  for each industry. The levels of average DPO 
for the wholesale trade and for manufacturing are higher than the ratio for other 
industries. The average DPO for the wholesale trade is 61.08 and the ratio for 
manufacturing is 47.68. Also, the levels of average DPO for construction and retail 
trade are both over 30. Because of this table, firms in the other industries (that is, 
transportation and communications, restaurants, and real estate) do not use trade credit 
frequently. We predict that the effects of credit contagion are serious for firms that 
depend on trade credit because of industry characteristics.   
 
To check this hypothesis, we estimate Equation (1) for each type of industry. The 
results of trade receivables for each industry are presented in Tables 10–14. The 
coefficients of the products of trade receivables and the year dummies for 1997 and 
1998 are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for all industries. These 
results suggest that suppliers reduce trade credit more for customers with higher trade 
receivables, which was not dependent on industry characteristics in 1997 and 1998. 
 
According to Tables 15–19, the results of credit risk are different between each industry. 
The results of the year dummies are similar to Table 7 if we limit the samples for each 
industry
8, which implies that the trade payables growth rate was low in all industries in 
1997 and 1998. In Table 15, we limit the samples to manufacturers. The coefficients of 
credit risk * year dummy for 1997 are positive and statistically significant if we use the 
capital deficiency1 and total loans–sales ratio as proxies of credit risk. In addition, the 
coefficients of credit risk * year dummy for 1998 are positive and statistically 
                                                 
7  “Day payables outstanding” is defined as (a firm’s trade payables/ total sales)* 365.  13
significant except for column (3). Although the products of the leverage and the year 
dummies for 1997 and 1998 are not statistically significant, we can interpret this result 
as suggesting that credit contagion in 1997 and 1998 significantly reduced credit supply 
for risky and non-risky firms in manufacturing.   
 
The effects of credit contagion for trade credit supply are weak in other industries. In 
Table 16, we limit samples to wholesalers. The effects of the total debts–sales ratio * 
year dummies for 1997 and 1998 are positive and significant (column (4)), but the 
results in columns (1)–(3) do not support the hypothesis. The results for construction 
and retail trade (Tables 17 and 18) are similar. The coefficients of the products of the 
total loans–sales ratio and the year dummy for 1997 are statistically positive (column 
(4)), but the other proxies of credit risk have larger negative effects in 1998 (columns 
(1)–(3)). Moreover, when we use samples for transportation and communications, 
restaurants, real estate and services (Table 19), the coefficients of the total loans–sales 
ratio become higher in 1997 and 1998, but the negative effects of the other proxies of 
credit risk are larger in 1998. This result implies that suppliers reduced trade credit more 




5 Conclusion   
We have investigated the effects of the credit chain and the increase in dishonored bills 
for trade credit supply using small business data in Japan. Our results are summarized as 
follows: 1) suppliers reduce trade credit more for customers with higher trade 
receivables because they avoid default because of credit contagion; 2) in the 
non-recession periods, suppliers reduce trade credit for risky firms, but they reduce 
trade credit more for both risky and non-risky firms in manufacturing during the 
recession periods; 3) the effects of credit risk are weak in other industries, even if the 
trade credit link is close. Our results imply that credit contagion in recession periods 
reduces trade credit more for manufacturers.   
                                                                                                                                               
8  The results are not shown in Tables 15–19. 
9  In Table 5, the coefficients of the proxies of credit risk become statistically significant if we exclude the cross  14
 
A Definition of Variables 
 
Dependent variables 




Trade receivable turnaround period Trade receivables/sales. 
Trade receivables - assets ratio turnaround period Trade receivables/assets. 
 
Credit risk 
Capital deficiency1 = 1 if a firm’s capital is negative in year t-1, t or t+1. 
Capital deficiency2 = 1 if a firm satisfies at least one of the following conditions: 1) a 
firm’s capital is negative in year t-1, t or t+1; 2) a firm’s profit is negative from 
t-1 to t+1 (profit is negative for three consecutive years). 
Leverage = Total debts/assets 
Total debts to sales ratio = Total debts/sales 
 
Firm characteristics variables 
Scale Log(1+sales). 
Cash–short-term debts ratio Cash/short-term debts. 
 
Performance 
ROA The ratio of the sum of a firm’s operating income, interest receivables, and 
dividend to total assets for each year.   
Sales growth The annual growth rate of a firm’s sales (Δsales/total assets).   
 
 
Credit terms with the bank   
                                                                                                                                               
terms in Tables 16–19.  15
Tangible asset ratio The ratio of a firm’s tangible assets (which is the sum of the book 
value of buildings and land) to total debts.   
Interest rate The ratio of a firm’s interest expenses to the sum of its short-term debt, 
long-term debt, and discounted notes receivable, minus the prime rate (in 
percentages). We do not have data on the prime rate in each bank. Hence, we 
obtained the short-term prime rate at the end of March from Financial and 
Economics Statistics Monthly issued by the Bank of Japan.   
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 Table 1: The Number and Sum of Dishonored Bills, 1995–1999
Year Number Sum Annual Change Dishonored Bills/Total Bills
(thousand sheet) (million yen) Number(%) Sum(%) Number(%) Sum(%)
1995 532 1,127,207 8.2 -0.3 0.17 0.06
1996 506 972,616 -4.9 -13.7 0.17 0.06
1997 571 1,142,239 12.9 17.4 0.20 0.07
1998 648 1,235,348 13.4 8.2 0.25 0.10
1999 477 961,970 -26.4 -22.1 0.20 0.08
Source: The Japanese Bankers Association, Kessan Tokei Nenpo
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Source: Tokyo Shoko Research, Ltd., Bankruptcy White Paper.
20Table 2: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables
Panel A: Deﬁned as (Trade Payablest+1-Trade Payablest)/Trade Payablest*100
Firm Scale
Year Smaller Middle Larger Total
1995 -2.53% 1.32% 5.18% 2.71%
1996 -4.32% 0.00% 1.98% 0.59%
1997 -12.89% -8.27% -5.24% -6.91%
1998 -13.31% -11.49% -8.52% -10.01%
1999 -5.61% -2.84% -0.58% -1.95%
2000 -3.51% -1.11% 1.43% 0.00%
Note: We show only the median of the trade payable growth rate because the distribution is skewed. We deﬁne
small-sized ﬁrms as those whose average sales were less than 100 million yen, and middle-sized ﬁrms as those
whose average sales were less than 300 million yen and more than 100 million yen. Larger-sized ﬁrms are ﬁrms
whose average sales were more than 300 million yen.
Panel B: Deﬁned as (Trade Payablest+1-Trade Payablest)/Total Assetst*100
Firm Scale
Year Smaller Middle Larger Total
1996 0.40% 1.02% 0.90% 0.83%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.12%) (0.00%)
1997 -0.63% -0.68% -0.85% -0.74%
(0.00%) (-0.16%) (-0.52%) (-0.15%)
1998 -0.69% -1.06% -1.25% -1.05%
(0.00%) (-0.27%) (-0.75%) (-0.25%)
1999 0.14% 0.35% 0.38% 0.31%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%)
2000 0.42% 0.94% 1.19% 0.89%
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.12%) (0.00%)
Note: We show the average and the median of each ratio in parentheses. We calculate the average for each group
without ﬁrms whose trade payables growth rate belongs to the lower 0.5% percentile or the upper 99.5% percentile.
We deﬁne small-sized ﬁrms as those whose average sales were less than 100 million yen, and middle-sized ﬁrms as
those whose average sales were less than 300 million yen and more than 100 million yen. Larger-sized ﬁrms are




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 5: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Credit Risk
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models OLS OLS OLS OLS
Proxy of Credit Risk Capital Capital Leverage Total Loans






(0.00040) (0.00043) (0.00057) (0.00008)






















(0.00240) (0.00232) (0.00205) (0.00199)





(0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00015) (0.00014)
Interest Rate -0.00010 -0.00009 0.00021 0.00013
(0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00013) (0.00013)

















(0.00091) (0.00091) (0.00052) (0.00052)
Year=1999 -0.00134 -0.00133 -0.00155
∗∗∗ -0.00151
∗∗∗






(0.00091) (0.00091) (0.00050) (0.00050)
Observations 220,350 220,350 293,331 292,942
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes industrial dummies that are recorded
in the CRD dataset. Regional dummies are also added except for column (3). When variables include outliers,
they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does not change if
we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample.
24Table 6: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Trade Receivables
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Growth Rate Prob (Payables Growth ≥ 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models OLS OLS Logit Logit
Proxy of Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables






(0.00161) (0.00177) (0.00144) (0.03632)



































(0.00240) (0.00240) (0.05227) (0.05237)





(0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00402) (0.00399)
Interest Rate -0.00013 -0.00002 -0.02019
∗∗∗ -0.01645
∗∗∗
(0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00335) (0.00334)
















(0.00100) (0.00099) (0.02678) (0.02650)
Year=1999 -0.00144 -0.00126 0.04486
∗∗ 0.04182
∗






(0.00091) (0.00091) (0.02220) (0.02215)
Observations 220,350 221,347 221,808 222,815
R-squared 0.09 0.09
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.08
Log Likelihood -140982.87 -142245.02
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes regional and industrial dummies that
are recorded in the CRD dataset. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles
or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does not change if we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th
percentiles of the sample.
25Table 7: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Credit Risk
Dependent variable Trade Payables Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models OLS OLS OLS OLS
Proxy of Credit Risk Capital Capital Leverage Total Loans






(0.00050) (0.00055) (0.00068) (0.00009)





(0.00096) (0.00108) (0.00143) (0.00016)
Year=1998 0.00013 -0.00148 -0.00474
∗∗∗ 0.00218
∗∗∗
(0.00086) (0.00096) (0.00126) (0.00016)
Control Variables






















(0.00240) (0.00233) (0.00205) (0.00199)





(0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00015) (0.00014)
Interest Rate -0.00010 -0.00009 0.00021 0.00013
(0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00013) (0.00013)


















(0.00095) (0.00094) (0.00119) (0.00058)
Year=1999 -0.00136 -0.00133 -0.00155
∗∗∗ -0.00147
∗∗∗






(0.00091) (0.00091) (0.00050) (0.00050)
Observations 220,350 220,350 293,331 292,942
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes regional and industrial dummies that
are recorded in the CRD dataset. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles
or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does not change if we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th
percentiles of the sample.
26Table 8: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Credit Risk – Logit Estimation
Dependent Variable Prob (Payables Growth ≥ 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models Logit Logit Logit Logit
Proxy of a Firm’s Risk Capital Capital Leverage Total Loans






(0.01359) (0.01443) (0.01517) (0.00407)































(0.03167) (0.03164) (0.02713) (0.02714)
Tangible Asset Ratio 0.03577 0.09048
∗ 0.07195 0.16031
∗∗∗






(0.00402) (0.00406) (0.00364) (0.00344)





(0.00335) (0.00335) (0.00281) (0.00281)



























(0.02229) (0.02228) (0.01310) (0.01309)
Observations 221,808 221,808 295,462 295,108
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Log Likelihood -141077.66 -141089.13 -188662.46 -188604.71
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes regional and industrial dummies that
are recorded in the CRD dataset. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles
or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does not change if we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Table 10: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Trade Receivables, Compared by Industry
(The coeﬃcients of control variables are not reported)
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Growth Rate Prob (Payables Growth ≥ 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models OLS OLS Logit Logit
Industry Manufacture
Proxy of Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables






(0.00340) (0.00362) (0.10759) (0.08353)












(0.00610) (0.00623) (0.22387) (0.16000)
Observations 65,481 65,664 65,752 65,936
R-squared 0.16 0.16
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.09
Log Likelihood -41183.96 -41417.05
Table 11: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Trade Receivables, Compared by Industry
(The coeﬃcients of control variables are not reported)
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Growth Rate Prob (Payables Growth ≥ 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models OLS OLS Logit Logit
Industry Wholesales trade
Proxy of Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables





(0.00547) (0.00469) (0.13958) (0.09347)












(0.01043) (0.00821) (0.29446) (0.17499)
Observations 32,491 32,681 32,775 32,965
R-squared 0.15 0.14
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.08
Log Likelihood -20472.72 -20706.72
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes regional dummies. When variables
include outliers, they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does
not change if we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample.
29Table 12: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Trade Receivables, Compared by Industry
(The coeﬃcients of control variables are not reported)
Dependent variable Trade Payables Growth Rate Prob (Payables Growth ≥ 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models OLS OLS Logit Logit
Industry Construction
Proxy of Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables






(0.00612) (0.00463) (0.12165) (0.07903)






(0.01211) (0.00940) (0.26909) (0.16857)
Year=1998 -0.00847 -0.02065
∗∗ -0.11555 -0.09461
(0.01170) (0.00882) (0.23837) (0.15194)
Observations 34052 34169 34538 34658
R-squared 0.10 0.09
Pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.05
Log Likelihood -22480.21 -22694.64
Table 13: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Trade Receivables, Compared by Industry
(The coeﬃcients of control variables are not reported)
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Growth Rate Prob (Payables Growth ≥ 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models OLS OLS Logit Logit
Industry Retail trade
Proxy of Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables





(0.00555) (0.00537) (0.15779) (0.10723)












(0.01014) (0.00956) (0.31903) (0.20325)
Observations 25,330 25,417 25,470 25,557
R-squared 0.09 0.09
Pseudo R-squared 0.06 0.05
Log Likelihood -16590.03 -16665.59
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes regional dummies. When variables
include outliers, they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does
not change if we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample.
30Table 14: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Trade Receivables, Compared by Industry
(The coeﬃcients of control variables are not reported)
Dependent variable Trade Payables Growth Rate Prob (Payables Growth ≥ 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models OLS OLS Logit Logit
Industry Transportation and Communications, Restaurants, Real Estate, Services
Proxy of Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables Trade Receivables






(0.00339) (0.00300) (0.11090) (0.06988)












(0.00657) (0.00537) (0.21570) (0.12713)
Observations 62,996 63,416 63,273 63,699
R-squared 0.03 0.03
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.07
Log Likelihood -38661.86 -39118.41
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes regional dummies. When variables
include outliers, they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does
not change if we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample.
31Table 15: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Credit Risk, Compared by Industry
(The coeﬃcients of control variables are not reported)
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models OLS OLS OLS OLS
Industry Manufacturing
Proxy of a Firm’s Risk Capital Capital Leverage Total Loans
Deﬁciency1 Deﬁciency2 -Sales Ratio





(0.00087) (0.00096) (0.00125) (0.00032)









(0.00149) (0.00166) (0.00233) (0.00068)
Observations 65,481 65,481 86,138 86,214
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15
Table 16: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Credit Risk, Compared by Industry
(The coeﬃcients of control variables are not reported)
Dependent variable Trade Payables Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models OLS OLS OLS OLS
Industry Wholesales trade
Proxy of a Firm’s Risk Capital Capital Leverage Total Loans
Deﬁciency1 Deﬁciency2 -Sales Ratio
A Firm’s Risk -0.00213 -0.00049 -0.00334 -0.00449
∗∗∗
(0.00162) (0.00191) (0.00274) (0.00058)
Proxy of a Firm’s Risk * Year Dummy
Year=1997 0.00159 -0.00103 -0.00692 0.00306
∗∗∗
(0.00314) (0.00389) (0.00543) (0.00114)
Year=1998 0.00009 -0.00214 -0.00712 0.00370
∗∗∗
(0.00276) (0.00341) (0.00526) (0.00117)
Observations 32,491 32,491 43,048 43,071
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes regional dummies. When variables
include outliers, they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does
not change if we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample.
32Table 17: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Credit Risk, Compared by Industry
(The coeﬃcients of control variables are not reported)
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models OLS OLS OLS OLS
Industry Construction
Proxy of a Firm’s Risk Capital Capital Leverage Total Loans
Deﬁciency1 Deﬁciency2 -Sales Ratio
A Firm’s Risk -0.00110 -0.00033 -0.00560
∗∗∗ -0.01084
∗∗∗
(0.00173) (0.00185) (0.00210) (0.00080)
Proxy of a Firm’s Risk * Year Dummy
Year=1997 -0.00321 -0.00107 -0.00426 0.00705
∗∗∗





(0.00308) (0.00332) (0.00407) (0.00276)
Observations 34,052 34,052 45,759 45,831
R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Table 18: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Credit Risk, Compared by Industry
(The coeﬃcients of control variables are not reported)
Dependent Variable Trade Payables Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models OLS OLS OLS OLS
Industry Retail trade
Proxy of a Firm’s Risk Capital Capital Leverage Total Loans
Deﬁciency1 Deﬁciency2 -Sales Ratio
A Firm’s Risk 0.00091 0.00024 -0.00300
∗ -0.00256
∗∗∗
(0.00133) (0.00143) (0.00158) (0.00039)
Proxy of a Firm’s Risk * Year Dummy
Year=1997 -0.00076 -0.00122 0.00380 0.00329
∗∗∗





(0.00220) (0.00247) (0.00286) (0.00093)
Observations 25,330 25,330 34,208 34,303
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes regional dummies. When variables
include outliers, they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does
not change if we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample.
33Table 19: The Growth Rate of Trade Payables and Credit Risk, Compared by Industry
(The coeﬃcients of control variables are not reported)
Dependent variable Trade Payables Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Models OLS OLS OLS OLS
Industry Transportation and Communications, Restaurants,
Real estate, Services
Proxy of a Firm’s Risk Capital Capital Leverage Total Loans
Deﬁciency1 Deﬁciency2 -Sales Ratio
A Firm’s Risk -0.00070 0.00005 0.00107 -0.00103
∗∗∗
(0.00069) (0.00075) (0.00098) (0.00007)
Proxy of a Firm’s Risk * Year Dummy
Year=1997 0.00121 0.00123 0.00005 0.00077
∗∗∗






(0.00121) (0.00132) (0.00180) (0.00012)
Observations 62,996 62,996 84,178 83,523
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each regression includes regional dummies. When variables
include outliers, they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does
not change if we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample.
34